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Abstract
We consider online variations of the Pandora’s box prob-
lem (Weitzman. 1979), a standard model for understand-
ing issues related to the cost of acquiring information for
decision-making. Our problem generalizes both the classic
Pandora’s box problem and the prophet inequality frame-
work. Boxes are presented online, each with a random value
and cost drawn jointly from some known distribution. Pan-
dora chooses online whether to open each box given its cost,
and then chooses irrevocably whether to keep the revealed
prize or pass on it. We aim for approximation algorithms
against adversaries that can choose the largest prize over any
opened box, and use optimal offline policies to decide which
boxes to open (without knowledge of the value inside)1. We
consider variations where Pandora can collect multiple prizes
subject to feasibility constraints, such as cardinality, matroid,
or knapsack constraints. We also consider variations related
to classic multi-armed bandit problems from reinforcement
learning. Our results use a reduction-based framework where
we separate the issues of the cost of acquiring information
from the online decision process of which prizes to keep. Our
work shows that in many scenarios, Pandora can achieve a
good approximation to the best possible performance.
1 Introduction
Information learning costs play a large role in a variety of
markets and optimization tasks. For example, in the aca-
demic job market, obtaining information about a potential
match is a costly investment for both sides of the market.
Conserving on information costs is an important component
of efficiency in such settings.
A classic model for information learning costs is
the Pandora’s box problem, attributed to Weitzman
(Weitzman. 1979), which has the following form. Pandora
has n boxes, where the ith box contains a prize of value
vi that has a known cumulative distribution function Fi. It
costs ci to open the ith box and reveal the actual value vi.
Pandora may open as many boxes as she likes, in any order.
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1See section 2 for formal definitions.
The payoff is the maximum-valued prize, minus the cost of
the opened boxes. That is, if S is the subset of opened boxes,
then the payoff Pandora seeks to maximize is
max
i∈S
vi −
∑
i∈S
ci.
The Pandora’s box problem incorporates two key decision
aspects: the ordering for opening boxes, and when to stop. It
has been proposed for applications such as buying or selling
a house and searching for a job.
The original Pandora’s box problem has a simple and el-
egant solution. The reservation price v∗i associated with an
unopened box i is the value for which Pandora would be in-
different taking a prize with that value and opening box i.
That is,
v∗i = inf{y : y ≥ −ci + E [max vi, y]}
= inf{y : ci ≥ E [max vi − y, 0]}.
This result says that if Pandora is allowed to choose
the ordering, Pandora should keep opening boxes in the
order of decreasing reservation price, but should stop
searching when the largest prize value obtained exceeds
the reservation price of all unopened boxes. An alter-
native proof to Weitzman’s proof (Weitzman. 1979) of
this was recently provided by Kleinberg, Waggoner, and
Weyl (Robert Kleinberg and Weyl. 2016), who also present
additional applications, including to auctions. Very recently
Singla (Singla. 2018) generalizes the approach of Kleinberg
et al. (Robert Kleinberg and Weyl. 2016) for more applica-
tions in offline combinatorial problems such as matching,
set cover, facility location, and prize-collecting Steiner tree.
In other similar problems, the ordering is chosen ad-
versarially and adaptively. For example, in the prophet
inequality setting first introduced in 1977 by Garling,
Krengel, and Sucheston (Krengel and Sucheston 1978;
Krengel and Sucheston 1977), the boxes have no cost, and
the prize distributions are known, but the decision-maker has
to decide after each successive box whether to stop the pro-
cess and keep the corresponding prize; if not, the prize can-
not be claimed later. It is known that there exists a threshold-
based algorithm that in expectation obtains a prize value
within a factor of two of the expected maximum prize (and
the factor of two is tight) (Krengel and Sucheston 1978;
Krengel and Sucheston 1977). There have subsequently
been many generalizations of the prophet inequality set-
ting, especially to applications in online auctions (see
e.g. (Mohammad Taghi Hajiaghayi and Sandholm. 2007;
Alaei, Hajiaghayi, and Liaghat 2012;
Hajiaghayi, Kleinberg, and Parkes 2004; Alaei 2014;
Yan 2011; Kleinberg and Weinberg 2012;
Babaioff, Immorlica, and Kleinberg 2007;
Lachish 2014; Feldman, Svensson, and Zenklusen 2015;
Goel and Mehta 2008; Korula and Pa´l 2009;
Mahdian and Yan 2011; Karande, Mehta, and Tripathi 2011;
Kesselheim et al. 2013; Guruganesh and Singla. 2017;
Esfandiari et al. 2017; Paul Duetting and Lucier. 2017)).
Another related and well-studied theme includes multi-
armed bandit problems and more generally reinforcement
learning (see, e.g., (Gittins and Jones. 1974)). In this setting,
each “box” corresponds to a strategy, or arm, that has a pay-
off in each round. An online algorithm chooses one arm
from a set of arms in each round over n rounds. Viewed in
the language of selection problems, this translates to a fea-
sibility constraint on the set of boxes that can be opened.
Multi-armed bandit problems have applications including
online auctions, adaptive routing, and the theory of learning
in games.
In this paper, we consider a class of problems that com-
bine the cost considerations of Pandora’s box with the on-
line nature of prophet inequality problems. Again boxes
are presented online, here with random values and costs
drawn jointly from some distribution. Pandora chooses on-
line whether to open each box, and then whether to keep
it or pass on it. We aim for approximation algorithms
against adversaries that can choose the largest prize over
any opened box, and use optimal offline policies in deciding
which boxes to open, without knowledge of the value inside.
We consider variations where Pandora can collect multiple
prizes subject to sets of constraints. For example, Pandora
may be able to keep at most k prizes, the selected prizes
must form an independent set in a matroid, or the prizes
might have associated weights that form a knapsack con-
straint. We also introduce variations related to classic multi-
armed bandit problems and reinforcement learning, where
there are feasibility constraints on the set of boxes that can
be opened. Our work shows that in many scenarios even
without the power of ordering choices, Pandora can achieve
a good approximation to the best possible performance.
Our main result is a reduction from this general class of
problems, which we refer to as online Pandora’s box prob-
lems, to the problem of finding threshold-based algorithms
for the associated prophet inequality problems where all
costs are zero. Our reduction is constructive, and results in a
polynomial-time policy, given a polynomial-time algorithm
for constructing thresholds in the reduced problem. We first
describe the reduction in Section 2. Then in Section 3, we
show how to use known results from the prophet inequality
literature to directly infer solutions to online Pandora’s box
problems. Finally, in Section 4, we establish an algorithm
for a multi-armed bandit variant of the online Pandora’s box
problem, by proving a novel multi-armed prophet inequality.
2 Pandora’s Boxes Under General
Constraints
In this section we consider a very general version of an on-
line Pandora’s box problem, with the goal of showing that,
if there is a suitable corresponding prophet inequality algo-
rithm, we can use it in a way that yields good approximation
ratios for the Pandora’s box problem.We define the problem
as follows. There is a sequence of boxes that arrive online,
in an order chosen by an adversary (i.e., worst case order).
Each box has a cost ci, a value vi, and a type ti. The tuple
(ci, vi, ti) is drawn from a joint distribution Fi. The distri-
butions are known in advance. When a box is presented, we
observe its type ti. We can then choose whether to open the
box. We note that, given the type ti, vi and ci have condi-
tional distributions depending on the type ti. There is a set
of constraints dictating what combinations of boxes can be
opened; these constraints can depend on the indexes of the
boxes and their types. If we open the box, then vi and ci
are revealed, and we pay ci for opening the box. We must
then choose (irrevocably) whether to keep and collect vi.
There is also a set of constraints dictating what combina-
tions of values can be kept; these constraints can depend on
the indexes of the boxes and their types. We indicate the set
of opened boxes by S ⊆ {1, . . . , n} and the set of of kept
boxes by R ⊆ S. The goal is to maximize the expected util-
ity E
[∑
i∈R vi −
∑
i∈S ci
]
.
One might want to consider an adversary that obtains
E[maxR,S
∑
i∈R vi −
∑
i∈S ci], that is, a fully clairvoyant
adversary.However, it is not possible to provide any compet-
itive algorithm against such an adversary even for the simple
classical Pandora’s box problem.2
We denote the expected utility of an algorithm Alg by
uAlg. We compare our algorithms against the (potentially
exponential time) optimal offline algorithm Opt that max-
imizes the expected utility. Specifically, Opt can see all the
types ti of all the boxes, and Opt can choose to open boxes
in any order. However,Opt does not learn the resulting cost
and value ci and vi for a box until it is opened. Opt itera-
tively and adaptively opens boxes and at the end chooses a
subset of opened boxes to keep. Of course Opt must respect
the constraints on opened boxes and kept boxes.
We first prove some fundamental lemmas that capture im-
portant structure for this Pandora’s box problem. We then
use these lemmas to provide a strong connection between
the online Pandora’s box problem and prophet inequalities.
Our results allow us to translate several prophet inequali-
ties algorithms, such as prophet inequalities under capacity
constraints, matroid constraints, or knapsack constraints, to
2Consider the following example with n identical (and inde-
pendent) boxes where we have no constraint on opening boxes and
can accept exactly one box at the end. The value of each box is 0
with probability 1/2 and 2 with probability 1/2; the cost of each
box is 1. Note that the cost of each box is equal to its expected
value. Hence, the expected utility of any online algorithm is upper
bounded by 0. However, with probability 1− 1
2n
at least one of the
boxes has a value 2. A fully clairvoyant adversary only opens the
box with value 2 and obtain a utility 2× (1− 1
2n
)−1 = 1− 1
2n−1
.
This is a positive utility when n ≥ 2.
algorithms for online Pandora’s box algorithms under the
same constraints.
2.1 Fundamental Lemmas
Our lemmas allow us flexibility in considering the distribu-
tion of costs, and show how we can preserve approximation
ratios.
Definition 1 Let F1, . . . , Fn, and F
′
1, . . . , F
′
n be two se-
quences of boxes. Denote the outcomes of Fi and F
′
i by
(vi, ci, ti) and (v
′
i, c
′
i, t
′
i) respectively. We say the two se-
quences are cost-equivalent if (a) they can be coupled so
that for all i we have vi = v
′
i and ti = t
′
i, and (b)
E [ci | ti] = E [c
′
i | ti] for all ti.
Lemma 2 Let F1, . . . , Fn, and F
′
1, . . . , F
′
n be two cost-
equivalent sequences of boxes. Let Alg′ be an online (resp.,
offline) algorithm that achieves an expected utility uAlg′ on
boxes F ′1, . . . , F
′
n. There exists an online (resp., offline) al-
gorithm Alg that achieves the same expected utility on boxes
F1, . . . , Fn.
Proof : We will first suppose that Alg′ is online, so that the
order of arrival is predetermined and the types are revealed
online. We will define algorithm Alg using the run of al-
gorithm Alg′ on a simulated set of boxes F ′1, . . . , F
′
n. When
Alg′ attempts to open a boxF ′i we do the following.We open
Fi, and let (vi, ci, ti) be the outcome. Then we draw a triple
(v′i, c
′
i, t
′
i) from F
′
i , conditioning on v
′
i = vi and t
′
i = ti, and
report it to Alg′. Alg then opens the box if and only if Alg′
does, and likewise keeps the box if and only if Alg′ does.
Let Yi be a binary random variable that is 1 if Alg
′ opens
box i and 0 otherwise. Also, letXi be a binary random vari-
able that is 1 if Alg′ keeps box i and 0 otherwise. Note that
for any particular i, at the time that the algorithm decides
about Yi, ci is unknown to the algorithm. Moreover, ci may
be correlated with ti, but is independent of all observations
of the algorithm from prior rounds. Therefore, after condi-
tioning on ti, Yi is independent of ci. We have
uAlg′ = E
[
n∑
i=1
Xiv
′
i −
n∑
i=1
Yic
′
i
]
Definition of utility
= E
[
n∑
i=1
Xiv
′
i −
n∑
i=1
E [Yic
′
i]
]
Linearity of Exp.
= E
[
n∑
i=1
Xiv
′
i −
n∑
i=1
Et′
i
[E [Yic
′
i | t
′
i]]
]
Draw t′i first
= E
[
n∑
i=1
Xiv
′
i −
n∑
i=1
Et′
i
[YiE [c
′
i | t
′
i]]
]
Yi indep. of c
′
i|t
′
i
= E
[
n∑
i=1
Xivi −
n∑
i=1
Eti [Yi E [ci | ti]]
]
cost-equivalence
= E
[
n∑
i=1
Xivi −
n∑
i=1
Eti [E [Yici | ti]]
]
Yi indep. of ci|ti
= E
[
n∑
i=1
Xivi −
n∑
i=1
Yici
]
Linearity of Exp.
= uAlg. Alg opens and keeps the same sets as Alg
′
The case where Alg′ is an offline algorithm is similar. The
only difference is that the full profile of types is known to the
algorithm in advance, and hence Yi and Xi can depend on
this profile. We therefore fix the type profile, interpret vari-
ables Xi and Yi as being conditioned on this realization of
the types, interpret all expectations with respect to this con-
ditioning, and the argument proceeds as before (noting that
the distribution of c′i can depend on t
′
i, but is independent of
other types). Note that this actually simplifies the chain of
inequalities above, as the conditioning on t′i on the third line
is trivial and unnecessary when t′i is fixed. 
Lemma 3 Let F1, . . . , Fn, and F
′
1, . . . , F
′
n be two cost-
equivalent sequences of boxes. Let Alg′ be an online (resp.,
offline) α-approximation algorithm on boxes F ′1, . . . , F
′
n.
There exists an online (resp., offline) α-approximation al-
gorithm Alg on boxes F1, . . . , Fn.
Proof : Let Opt and Opt′ be the optimum (offline) al-
gorithms for boxes F1, . . . , Fn and F
′
1, . . . , F
′
n respectively.
Let Alg be the algorithm of Lemma 2 applied to Alg′. More-
over, note that Applying Opt to Lemma 2 implies that there
is some offline algorithm Alg′′ on boxes F ′1, . . . , F
′
n such
that uOpt = uAlg′′ . We bound the approximation factor of
Alg as follows.
uAlg
uOpt
=
uAlg′
uOpt
By Lemma 2
=
uAlg′
uAlg′′
uOpt = uAlg′′
≥
uAlg′
uOpt′
definition of Opt′
≥ α. Alg′ is an α-approximation algorithm

Next we define the commitment Pandora’s box problem
on boxes F ∗1 = (v
∗
1 , c
∗
1, t
∗
1), . . . , F
∗
n = (v
∗
n, c
∗
n, t
∗
n). Com-
mitment Pandora’s box is similar to the Pandora’s box prob-
lem with the following two restrictions, that we refer to as
freeness and commitment, respectively.
• Freeness: Opening any box is free, i.e., for all i we have
c∗i = 0.
• Commitment: If a box F ∗i is opened and the value v
∗
i is
the maximum possible value of F ∗i , v
∗
i is kept.
Note that the commitment constraint is without loss of gen-
erality for an online algorithm, but is a non-trivial restriction
for an offline algorithm.
For each i, and for each type ti, we define a threshold
σi so that we have E [vi −min(vi, σi) | ti] = E [ci | ti]. If
ci = 0, we set σi to the supremum of the vi. (It is possible
to have σi be infinity, with the natural interpretation.) We
define F ∗i = (min(vi, σi), 0, ti) in the following lemma.
Theorem 4 Let Alg∗ be an α-approximation algorithm
for the commitment Pandora’s box problem on boxes
F ∗1 , . . . , F
∗
n . There exists an α-approximation algorithm Alg
for the Pandora’s box problem on F1, . . . , Fn.
Proof : First we define a sequence of boxes F ′1, . . . , F
′
n,
where for all i we have F ′i = (vi, vi −min(vi, σi), ti). That
is, we set v′i = vi, t
′
i = ti, and c
′
i = vi −min(vi, σi). Note
that by definition of σi we have E [vi −min(vi, σi) | ti] =
E [ci | ti] for all ti. Thus, by Lemma 3 an (online) α-
approximation algorithm for the Pandora’s box problem on
F ′1, . . . , F
′
n implies an α-approximation algorithm for the
Pandora’s box problem on F1, . . . , Fn as desired. Next, we
construct Alg′ required by Lemma 3 using Alg∗. To con-
struct Alg′, whenever Alg∗ attempts to open a box F ∗i , we
open F ′i and report (v
′
i − c
′
i, 0, ti) = (min(vi, σi), 0, ti) =
F ∗i to Alg
∗. Alg′ keeps the same set of boxes as Alg∗.
Let Yi be a binary random variable that is 1 if Alg
∗ opens
box i and 0 otherwise. Also, letXi be a binary random vari-
able that is 1 if Alg∗ keeps box i and 0 otherwise. Note
that v∗i = min(vi, σi) ≤ σi, and v
∗
i achieves it maxi-
mum value whenever vi ≥ σi. In this case by the commit-
ment constraint we haveXi = Yi. Therefore we either have
vi −min(vi, σi) = 0 orXi = Yi, which gives us
Yi
(
vi −min(vi, σi)
)
= Xi
(
vi −min(vi, σi)
)
(1)
Then for any fixed profile of types, and taking expectations
conditional on those type realizations, we have
uAlg′ = E
[
n∑
i=1
Xiv
′
i −
n∑
i=1
Yic
′
i
]
= E
[
n∑
i=1
Xivi −
n∑
i=1
Yi
(
vi −min(vi, σi)
)]
By def.
= E
[
n∑
i=1
Xivi −
n∑
i=1
Xi
(
vi −min(vi, σi)
)]
Eq. (1)
= E
[
n∑
i=1
Xi
(
vi −
(
vi −min(vi, σi)
))]
= E
[
n∑
i=1
Ximin(vi, σi)
]
= E
[
n∑
i=1
Xiv
∗
i
]
= uAlg∗ ,
where the first equality is since Alg′ opens and keeps the
same sets as Alg∗. Similarly, we can show uOpt′ = uOpt∗ ,
where Opt′ is the optimum algorithm for the Pandora’s box
problem on F ′1, . . . , F
′
n and Opt
∗ is the optimum algorithm
for the commitment Pandora’s box problem on F ∗1 , . . . , F
∗
n .
ThereforeAlg′ is an α-approximation algorithm for the Pan-
dora’s box problem on F ′1, . . . , F
′
n as promised. 
2.2 A Reduction for Online Pandora’s Box
Problems
In this section we use Theorem 4 to provide a strong con-
nection between the online Pandora’s box problem under
general constraints and prophet inequalities. This leads to
our main result: we prove that a threshold-based algorithm
for a prophet inequality problem, under any given feasibility
constraints on boxes that can be opened and/or prizes that
can be kept, immediately translates into an algorithm for the
online Pandora’s box problem. This reduction preserves the
approximation factor of the threshold-based algorithm. This
implies several approximation algorithms for the online Pan-
dora’s box problem under different constraints, which we
discuss in Section 3.
Recall that, in the online Pandora’s Box problem, the al-
gorithm is permitted to keep a set R ⊆ S of boxes and col-
lect the reward, where R and S are restricted to be from ar-
bitrary predefined collections of feasible collections R and
S. In the associated prophet inequality problem, the costs of
all boxes are known to be 0. In Theorem 5 below, we use
the notion of threshold-based algorithms for the prophet in-
equality problem defined as follows. We say an algorithm
is threshold-based if for every i ∈ {1, . . . , n} we have a
threshold τi(ti) (where the threshold can depend on the type
as well as the index) and the algorithm keeps a box if and
only if it not less than τi(ti). The threshold τi(ti) may be
adaptive, that is it may depend on any observation prior to
observing the ith box.
Theorem 5 LetAlgτ be a threshold-basedα-approximation
algorithm for the prophet inequalities problem, under a col-
lection of constraints. There exists an α-approximation al-
gorithm for the online Pandora’s box problem under the
same constraints.
Proof : We define F ∗i = (v
∗
i = min(vi, σi), c
∗
i = 0, ti).
Next we give an α-approximation algorithm Alg∗ for the
commitment Pandora’s box problem on boxes F ∗1 , . . . , F
∗
n .
This together with Theorem 4 will prove the theorem.
Let τi(.) be the threshold function used by Algτ given ob-
served values v∗1 , . . . , v
∗
n. We define Alg
∗
as follows. Upon
arrival of box F ∗i , first we check if σi ≥ τi(ti). Note that
this implicitly implies that the box is acceptable according
to the constraints. If σi ≥ τi(ti) we open the box, otherwise
we skip it. This ensures the commitment constraint. If we
opened the box and v∗i ≥ τi we keep it, otherwise we ig-
nore it and continue. It is easy to observe that Algτ and Alg
∗
provide the same outcome and have the same approximation
factor. 
3 Algorithms For Online Pandora’s Box via
Prophet Inequalities
Here we use the tools from the previous section to provide
algorithms for the online Pandora’s box problem under dif-
ferent kinds of constraints. First, as a warm-up, in Theo-
rem 6 we show a 1/2-approximation algorithm for a sim-
ple version of the problem where there are no constraints
on the set of boxes that we can open, and we can only
keep the value of one box. Note that this is the online ver-
sion of the classical Pandora’s box problem. Indeed it is
known that there is no 1/2 + ǫ approximation algorithm for
this problem even if all of the costs are 0 (where the prob-
lem is equivalent to a basic prophet inequalities problem)
(Kleinberg and Weinberg 2012). We will prove Theorem 6
directly, without appealing to Theorem 5, to provide insight
into how the given thresholds translate into a policy for the
Pandora’s Box problem.
Theorem 6 There exists a 1/2-approximation algorithm for
the online Pandora’s box problem with no constraints on
opening boxes, but the value of exactly one box is kept.
Proof : We define F ∗i = (v
∗
i = min(vi, σi), c
∗
i =
0, ti). Next we give a simple 1/2-approximation algorithm
Alg∗ for the commitment Pandora’s box problem on boxes
F ∗1 , . . . , F
∗
n . This together with Theorem 4 proves the theo-
rem.
Set τ such that Pr [maxni=1 v
∗
i ≥ τ ] =
1
2 . Let j be a ran-
dom variable that indicates the first index such that v∗ ≥ τ .
Let v∗ = v∗j , if there exists such index j, and let v
∗ =
0 otherwise. It is known that E [v∗] = 12 E [max
n
i=1 v
∗
i ]
(Samuel-Cahn 1984).
We define Alg∗ as follows. Upon arrival of box F ∗i , first
we check if σi ≥ τ . If it is we open the box, otherwise we
skip it. This ensures the commitment constraint; that is, if we
observe σi, we will accept it. Next, if we opened the box and
v∗i ≥ τi we keep it and terminate. Otherwise we continue to
the next box. It is easy to observe that Alg∗ keeps v∗, and
hence is a 1/2-approximation algorithm. 
We now explore other applications of our reduction. The-
orem 5, together with previously-known approximation al-
gorithms for prophet inequality problems with various types
of constraints, implies the existence of approximation algo-
rithms for variations of the online Pandora’s box problem.
Specifically, we have the following variations:
• Online k-Pandora’s box problem: we are given a cardinal-
ity k, and at most k boxes can be kept.
• Online knapsack Pandora’s box problem: we have a ca-
pacity C, and the type ti of each box corresponds to a
size. The total size of the boxes that can be kept is at most
C.
• Online matroid Pandora’s box problem: we have a ma-
troid constraint on the set of boxes, and the boxes that are
kept must be an independent set of the matroid.
We note that all of the variations above have no con-
straints on opening boxes; however, in what follows, we
study a variation of the problem with constraints on open-
ing boxes.
As we have mentioned, prophet inequality ap-
proximation algorithms for the settings of car-
dinality constraints (Alaei 2014), knapsack con-
straints (Paul Duetting and Lucier. 2017), and matriod
constraints (Kleinberg and Weinberg 2012) exist. Making
use of these results and Theorem 5 implies the following
corollary.
Corollary 7 There is
• a 1 − 1√
k+3
-approximation algorithm for the online k-
Pandora’s box problem,
• a 1/5-approximation algorithm for the online knapsack
Pandora’s box problem,
• and a 1/2-approximation algorithm for the online ma-
troid Pandora’s box problem.
4 Pandora’s Box with Multiple Arms
In the context reinforcement learning, we next consider a
multi-arm version of the Pandora’s box problem. In each of
J rounds, m boxes are presented. There are therefore mJ
boxes in total. At most one box can be opened in each round.
Them boxes presented in a given round are ordered; we can
think of each box as having a type labeled 1 throughm. All
boxes of type t have the same cost ct, and also have the same
value distribution Ft. For notational conveniencewe’ll write
vtj for the value in the box of type t presented at time j;
for convenience we assume vtj > 0. At the end of the J
rounds, the player can keep at most one prize for each type
of box. That is, if we write St for the subset of boxes of type
t opened by the player, then the objective is to maximize∑
t
max
j∈St
vtj − ct · |St|.
If no box of type t is opened, we’ll definemaxj∈St vtj (i.e.,
the prize for that type) to be 0. This is a variant of the online
Pandora’s box problem with a (partition) matroid constraint
on the set of prizes that can be kept, and also a constraint on
the subsets of boxes that can be opened.
We can think of this problem as presenting boxes one at
a time, where the boxes from a round are presented sequen-
tially, with the additional constraint that one box per round
can be selected. Note that types here are not random, but
would depend on the index of the box. Our previous reduc-
tion applies, so that solving this multi-arm Pandora’s box
problem reduces to developing the related prophet inequal-
ity. In this prophet inequality, boxes can be opened at no
cost, but we must irrevocably choose whether or not to keep
any given prize as it is revealed. We can still keep at most
one prize of each type, and we can still open at most one
box in each time period. Our question becomes: can we de-
velop a threshold policy to achieve a constant-factor prophet
inequality for this setting? In this case, a threshold policy
corresponds to choosing a threshold τt for each box type t,
and accepting a prize vtj from an opened box if and only if
vtj > τt.
What is an appropriate benchmark for the prophet in-
equality? Note that the sum of the best prizes of each type,
ex post, might not be achievable by any policy due to the
restriction on which boxes can be opened. We will therefore
compare against the following weaker benchmark. We con-
sider a prophet who must choose, in an online fashion, one
box to open in each round, given knowledge of the prizes in
previously opened boxes. Then, after having opened one box
on each of the J rounds, the prophet can select the largest ob-
served prize of each type. In other words, the prophet has the
advantage of being able to choose from among the opened
boxes in retrospect, but must still open boxes in an online
fashion. Our goal is to obtain a constant approximation to
the expected value enjoyed by such a prophet.
We begin with some observations about the choice of
which box to open. First, the optimal policy for the prophet
is to open boxes greedily. In particular, this policy can be
implemented in time linear inm, each round.
Lemma 8 In each round j, it is optimal for the prophet to
open a box of type t that maximizes his expected value, as if
the game were to end after time j.
Proof : Note that the expected marginal gain of opening
a box of type t can only decrease over time, and only as
more boxes of that type are opened. Suppose t is the box
with maximum expected marginal value at time j. Suppose
further that the prophet does not open box t, and furthermore
opens no box of type t until the final round J . Then t will
be the box with maximum expected marginal value in round
J , and therefore it would be optimal to open the box of type
t on the last round. This implies that it is optimal to open at
least one box of type t, at some point between round j and
the end of the game. The prophet is therefore at least as well
off by opening the box of type t immediately, since doing so
does not affect the distribution of the revealed value, and this
can only provides more information for determining which
other boxes to open. It is therefore (weakly) optimal to open
box t at time j. 
Similarly, once thresholds are fixed, an identical argu-
ment implies that the optimal threshold-based policy be-
haves greedily. In particular, the optimal policy can be im-
plemented in polynomial time, given an arbitrary set of
thresholds.
Lemma 9 Suppose the player’s policy is committed to se-
lecting a prize of type t, from an opened box of type t, if
and only if its value exceeds τt. Then, in each round j, it is
optimal to open a box t, from among those types for which
a prize has not yet been accepted, that maximizes his ex-
pected value as if the game were to end after time j. That is,
t ∈ argmaxt{E [vtj | vtj > τt] · Pr [vtj > τt]}.
We now claim that there are thresholds that yield a 2-
approximate prophet inequality for this setting. First, some
notation. By the principle of deferred randomness, we can
think of the value of the prize in any given box as only be-
ing determined at the moment the box is opened. With this
in mind, we will write wtk for the value observed in the
k’th box of type t opened by the decision-maker. For ex-
ample, wt1 is the value contained in whichever box of type
t is opened first, regardless of the exact time at which it is
opened. Note that the behavior of any online policy is fully
described by the profile of values w = (wtk), and each
wtk is a value drawn independently from distribution Ft. For
such a profilew, write y∗tk(w) for the indicator variable that
is 1 if the prophet opens at least k boxes of type t, and keeps
the k’th one opened. Then the expected value enjoyed by the
prophet is
Ew
[∑
k
∑
t
wtky
∗
tk(w)
]
.
For each box type t, we will set the threshold
τt =
1
2
Ew
[∑
k
wtky
∗
tk(w)
]
.
That is, τt is half of the expected value obtained by the
prophet from boxes of type t.
To prove that these thresholds achieve a good approxima-
tion to the prophet’s welfare, it will be useful to analyze the
possible correlation between the number of boxes of type t
opened by the prophet, and whether any prize of type t is
kept by the threshold algorithm. To this end, write z∗tk(w)
for the indicator that the prophet opens at least k boxes of
type t. Note that z∗tk(w) ≥ y
∗
tk(w) for all t, k, and w.
We’ll also write Qt(w) for the indicator variable that is 1
if wtkz
∗
tk(w) ≤ τt for all k. That is, Qt(w) = 1 if no box
of type t opened by the prophet has value greater than τt,
and hence the threshold algorithm does not keep any prize
of type t. The following lemma shows that Qt is positively
correlated with z∗tk, for every t and k.
Lemma 10 For all t and k, Ew [Qt(w) · z
∗
tk(w)] ≥
Ew [Qt(w)] · Ew [z
∗
tk(w)].
Proof : Fix the values of wℓk for all ℓ 6= t. Note that this
also fixes the choice of which box the prophet will open,
on any round in which the prophet chooses not to open a
box of type t. Due to the prophet’s greedy method of open-
ing boxes, at every time k, the prophet will choose to open
the box of type t if and only if the maximum value from
a box of type t, seen so far (or 0 if no box of type t has
been opened yet), is below a threshold determined by the
values observed from the other boxes. In other words, the
values wℓk for ℓ 6= k define a sequence of non-decreasing
thresholds h0, h1, h2, . . . , hJ with the following property.
Suppose, at time j, the prophet has previously opened s < j
boxes of type t, and has therefore opened j− s− 1 boxes of
types other than t. Then the prophet will open box t at time
j if and only if
max
r≤s
{wtr} < hj−s−1. (2)
Here and below, we’ll take the maximum of an empty set to
be 0.
We now claim that the prophet opens k or more boxes of
type t, at or before time J , if and only if maxr<k{wtr} <
hJ−k. We prove this claim by induction on J . The case
J = 1 is immediate, since box t is opened first if and only
if h0 > 0. Now suppose J > 1. If maxr<k{wtr} ≥ hJ−k,
then maxr≤k{wtr} ≥ hj−k−1 at all times j ≤ J , so by
(2) the prophet never chooses to open the k’th box of type
t. In the other direction, note that if maxr<k{wtr} < hJ−k,
then maxr<k−1{wtr} < h(J−1)−(k−1), so by induction the
prophet opens at least k − 1 boxes by time J − 1. This
means that either the prophet has already opened k boxes
of type t before time J (and we are done), or it has opened
exactly k − 1 boxes of type t before time J . In the latter
case, since we have maxr≤k−1{wtr} < hJ−(k−1)−1, we
conclude from (2) that the prophet opens box t at time J , as
required.
We are now ready to return to z∗tk and Qt. From the
claim above, we have that z∗tk(w) = 1 if and only if
maxr<k{wtr} < hJ−k. It suffices to show that this event
is only more likely to occur if we condition on the event
[Qt(w) = 1]. We will actually consider a stronger event
A, which is that maxr<J{wtr} ≤ τt. Note that event A is
more stringent than the event [Qt(w) = 1], since event A
requires that all of the first J values from box t are at most
τt, whether or not those boxes are opened. But since these
events differ only on values that are in unopened boxes, we
have E [z∗tk | A] = E [z
∗
tk | Qt], so it suffices to prove that
z∗tk is positively correlated with event A.
To show that E [z∗tk | A] ≥ E [z
∗
tk], we will couple out-
comes with and without this conditioning on A. To do
so, we imagine first drawing a sequence (wt1, wt2, . . . ),
then re-drawing any values that are greater than τt until
all values are at most τt; say (w
′
t1, w
′
t2, . . . ) is the modi-
fied profile. Note that since w′ts ≤ wts for all s, we have
that if [maxr<k{wtr} < hJ−k], then it must also be that
[maxr<k{w
′
tr} < hJ−k]. So the expected value of z
∗
tk
can only increase as a result of this transformation. Since
(wt1, wt2, . . . ) is chosen uniformly from all profiles, and
(w′t1, w
′
t2, . . . ) is distributed uniformly from profiles that
satisfy event A, we conclude that E [z∗tk | A] ≥ E [z
∗
tk] as
required. 
Finally, we can prove the multi-arm prophet inequality.
Theorem 11 The optimal threshold policy, using the thresh-
olds described above, achieves at least half of the expected
value enjoyed by the prophet for the multi-armed prophet
inequality problem.
Proof : As above, write y∗tk(w) for the indicator variable
for if the prophet opens at least k boxes of type t and keeps
the k’th one opened, and write z∗tk(w) for the indicator that
the prophet opens at least k boxes of type t. We’ll show a 2-
approximation for the policy that uses the given thresholds,
but chooses to open the same boxes that the prophet would
open. This will imply the theorem, since the optimal policy
that uses these thresholds τt would do at least as well as the
policy that opens the same boxes as the prophet.
Given this choice of what boxes to open, let ytk(w) be the
indicator variable that is 1 if the threshold algorithm opens
at least k boxes of type t and keeps the k’th one opened. The
total value obtained by the threshold algorithm is then
Ew
[∑
k
∑
t
wtkytk(w)
]
.
Note that the threshold algorithmmight not choose a prize of
every type, since it might be that all observed prizes of type t
are less than τt. WriteQtk(w) for the indicator variable that
is 1 if none of the first (up to) k boxes of type t opened by
the threshold algorithm are kept by the algorithm. We’ll also
write Qt(w) for the indicator variable that is 1 if no prize
of type t is kept by the threshold algorithm at any time. In
particular, Qt(w) ≤ Qtk(w) for all k. Finally, we’ll write
qt = Ew [Qt(w)].
We decompose the value generated by the algorithm into
(a) the value attributable to the thresholds, and (b) any value
in excess of the thresholds. That is,
Ew
[∑
k
∑
t
wtkytk(w)
]
=
Ew
[∑
k
∑
t
τtytk(w)
]
+ Ew
[∑
k
∑
t
(wtk − τt)ytk(w)
]
.
For the first term, we have
Ew
[∑
k
∑
t
τtytk(w)
]
=
∑
t
τt Ew
[∑
k
ytk(w)
]
=
∑
t
τt(1− qt)
=
1
2
∑
t
(1− qt) Ew
[∑
k
wtky
∗
tk(w)
]
(3)
The second term is more interesting. We have
Ew
[∑
k
∑
t
(wtk − τt)ytk(w)
]
≥
∑
t
∑
k
Ew
[
(wtk − τt)
+ · z∗tk(w) ·Qtk(w)
]
=
∑
t
∑
k
Ew
[
(wtk − τt)
+
]
· Ew [z
∗
tk(w) ·Qtk(w)]
≥
∑
t
∑
k
Ew
[
(wtk − τt)
+
]
· Ew [z
∗
tk(w) ·Qt(w)]
≥
∑
t
∑
k
Ew
[
(wtk − τt)
+
]
· Ew [z
∗
tk(w)] · Ew [Qt(w)]
=
∑
t
qt
∑
k
Ew
[
(wtk − τt)
+ · z∗tk(w)
]
≥
∑
t
qt
∑
k
Ew
[
(wtk − τt)
+ · y∗tk(w)
]
≥
∑
t
qt
(
Ew
[∑
k
wtky
∗
tk(w)
]
− τt
)
=
1
2
∑
t
qt Ew
[∑
k
wtky
∗
tk(w)
]
, (4)
where the first inequality is linearity of expectation and the
definition of y, the equality on the second line uses the
fact that wtk is independent of the values that occur ear-
lier (which determine z∗tk andQtk, and the inequality on the
fourth line is Lemma 10. The result now follows by adding
(3) and (4), yielding
Ew
[∑
k
∑
t
wtkytk(w)
]
≥
1
2
∑
t
Ew
[∑
k
wtky
∗
tk(w)
]
=
1
2
Ew
[∑
k
∑
t
wtky
∗
tk(w)
]
as required. 
We note that Theorem 11 is constructive, and the thresh-
olds can be computed to within an arbitrarily small error in
polynomial time. For example, this can be done by sampling
instances of w, simulating the behavior of the prophet, and
calculating an empirical average of the associated threshold
values. See (Paul Duetting and Lucier. 2017) for further de-
tails on this approach.
Applying the reduction from Theorem 5 to the prophet in-
equality in Theorem 11 yields a polynomial time algorithm
for the multi-arm online Pandora’s box problem.
Corollary 12 There is an 2-approximation algorithm for
the online multi-arm Pandora’s box problem.
5 Conclusion and Open Problems
We have presented a general reduction method for translat-
ing approximation algorithms in the prophet inequality set-
ting to corresponding approximation algorithms in the on-
line Pandora box setting with applications to information
learning. Further we have introduced a novel multi-armed
bandit Pandora box variation in the context of reinforcement
learning where our methods apply. Along the way, we have
considered many generalizations of the Pandora box prob-
lem, including allowing distributions on costs and the use of
types.
One open challenge is to relax the assumption that values,
costs, and/or types of different boxes are independent. One
could also generalize to objectives beyond maximizing the
sum of the values selected minus the cost of opening boxes.
For example, what happens if the cost of opening a box in-
creases as more boxes are opened? Finally, the multi-arm
prophet inequality is a special case of a more general class
of stochastic optimization problems, and it would be inter-
esting to extend to more general scenarios. For example, can
one extend the result to distributions that vary across time,
or to general matroid constraints over the set of boxes that
can be opened?
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